FOR THE RECORD

This is a letter from Brig Gen James Gavin in France to a friend in England to comment on the fine manner in which AAF planes carried US Army paratroopers to the jump locations on D Day Mr R J Stewart San Diego CA donated this letter to the US Air Force Museum

General Harold L Clark commanding 52nd Troop Carrier Wing

June 9th 1944

Dear Hal

Through the courtesy of Col Bruce D Bidwell who is leaving the beachhead today, I am able to get this short note to you Task force A has accomplished most of its objectives the 505th carrying out its mission exactly as planned Ste Mere Eglise was taken two hours after landing and the 507th and 508th are holding the line of the Merderet Lt Col Thomas J B Shanley commanding 2 nd Battalion 508 th Col George V Millett Jr commanding 507 th and Lt Col Charles J Timmes commanding 2nd Battalion 507 are still cut off but we may be able to pull them out in the next 24 hours The accomplishments of the parachute regiments are due to the conscientious and efficient tasks of delivery performed by your pilots and crews I am aware as we all are that your Wing suffered losses in carrying out its missions and that a very bad fog condition was encountered inside the west coast of the peninsula Yet despite this every effort was made for an exact and precise delivery as planned In most cases this was successful I want to express to you and all of the officers and enlisted men of your command our appreciation for a job damn well done

James Gavin

PS Generally speaking all is going well the 506th has done remarkably well although it has taken heavy casualties in spots

Would you please call Col Joel L Crouch commanding IX TCC Pathfinder and express to him our appreciation for a job well done

Jim

OTHER AIRBORNE COMMENTS

The officers who commanded the paratroops were aware of the problems of Troop Carrier aircrews and very soon after D Day the following letters excerpts were received by the Commanding General of Troop Carrier Command.

HEADQUARTERS 82 nd AIRBORNE DIVISION
8 JUNE 1944

Please express to all elements of your command who brought this division in
by parachute or who performed resupply missions for us our admiration for their
coolness under fire for their determination to overcome all obstacles and for their
magnificent spirit of cooperation

Mathew B Ridgway Maj General 82 nd Airborne Division

Brig. General Paul Williams endorsed this statement by General Ridgway

"The fact that General Ridgway under the stress of battle felt it necessary to forward that basic letter is particularly pleasing and will serve as additional evidence of his appreciation of a task well performed "I can only add my sincere appreciation for your loyalty and devotion to duty"

 

FROM THE 101 st AIRBORNE DIVISION ARCHIVES

At 10 15 pm June 5 1944 6,600 soldiers of the 101 st Airborne Division began taking off aboard 1,432 C 47 transport aircraft from England Shortly after midnight the C47s were over UTAH and the 101 st Paratroops began hitting the silk Problems began immediately Because of heavy enemy fire many of the transports had taken evasive action and could not find the proper drop zones In addition dense fog blanketed the area

Editorial comment
The 1,432 is probably a typographical error There were only 821 Troop Carrier C 47s in the entire mission The order of encountering the ground fire and the fog is reversed and this order changes the meaning The fog came first which caused the formation to scatter to avoid massive collisions Any evasive action would have come later by individual aircrews suddenly separated from the guidance and control of the formation.

General Omar Bradley was not Airborne but this is what he was quoted as saying in the book A General's Life; Simon Schuster New York 1983 p 247

Owing to foul weather and the anxiety and inexperience of some transport pilots most
of the American paratroopers were scattered far and wide of their objectives
Only a few units were able to organize and fight as planned

Editorial Comment
Military historians almost without exception have the greatest respect for General Bradley and so do we But we wonder if his views might not have been a bit different then if he had known all the details that we have been able to document since

DEBRIEFING CONFERENCE OPERATION NEPTUNE

In the search for accuracy a copy of the report of this conference was obtained from the US Army Military History Institute Carlisle PA The full report can be reviewed on the Institutes web site which is presdoc pl docnum 32 A more general web site is listed as US Army Military History Institute This was an 82 nd Airborne session that was held at the Globe Mount House Leicester England on 13 August 1944 Each commander present who had commanded a battalion or larger of the 82 nd Airborne Division in OPERATION NEPTUNE was permitted to talk not to exceed ten minutes

Instructions were that each officer was to speak freely without restraint regarding any aspect of the operation during its airborne phase and to offer any criticism he saw fit in the interests of improving our operational techniques in future combat

Commanders spoke in the same order their landings were scheduled Their statements were taken down verbatim as far as possible At the conclusion of the conference considerable free for all discussion took place of which no record was kept However it did have a strong bearing on the conclusions attached to this report which is a 15 page document in very fine print

Most of the content revolved around infantry planning and procedures after landing but there were some common observations about the flights and delivery that can be digested for Troop Carriers here Some said that their flight was too fast and too low while others complained about being dropped too high And all agreed that the formations held together very well across the channel and until they ran into the dense fog that shrouded the last leg of their flights to their objectives

If you are interested in the details, the document is posted here by clicking this link if you have Acrobat Reader installed. If you only wish to read the conclusions here they are

Weather Conditions

• It is interesting to note in Operation NEPTUNE that weather conditions were almost ideal until shortly after crossing the west coast of the peninsula There a dense fog was encountered that lasted almost up to the Merderet River This caused considerable dispersion and error in the drop of the 507 th and 508 th Parachute Infantry Regiments with the error generally being that of dropping well beyond the drop zone where the fog first cleared Unfortunately this put most of the equipment in the Merderet River or the swamps or tributaries of that river.
• 
  The 506 th Parachute Infantry Regiment jumped east of the Merderet River landed with most of its men in the drop zone area and promptly undertook to accomplish its mission The 507 th and 508 th Infantries with equal promptness moved to accomplish what was considered the next most important mission and that was the seizure of crossings over the Merderet River Due to the wide dispersion of these units this took a bit more time than was anticipated
  
  
• A number of airborne commanders present suggested that it be recommended to Troop Carrier commanders that they conduct unit proficiency test similar to those conducted in this Division Each unit to be given a mission to execute under simulated combat conditions

The Troop Carriers who reviewed this asked to the man How does one train to continue to fly a tight formation when suddenly engulfed in a dense fog You cannot fly formation on an aircraft you can't see. And what kind of training might have been devised to condition pilots to fly through flak and ground fire without actually firing at them in the training session?