Berlin

A large mission was dispatched on the 3rd, with the 353rd carrying 165 gallon belly tanks for the first time, but all planes turned back near the German border due to towering cloud formations. On the 4th, another Berlin mission was sent out. Again the mission was turned back by weather. But 30 B-17s failed to hear the recall and did bomb Berlin. Yet a further try was made on 6 March, and this time the 8th got through with 597 heavy bombers, hitting targets in the center of the city. The Berlin attack on March 6, escorted by close to 800 fighters fighters, precipitated the greatest air battle of the war.

Bomber losses totaled 69, against claims of 93 destroyed, 44 probably destroyed and 66 damaged. Fighter losses were 11 against claims of 82 destroyed, 9 probables and 32 damaged.

Escorting the 2nd Task Force of B-17s from Dummer Lake toward Berlin, the 353rd’s 31 Jugs ran into approximately one dozen FW 190s making head-on attacks against the bombers. Too late to stop the attack, Duncan led the Group down on the 190s as they came out from their attack, having shot down two B-17s.   He destroyed a pair of FW’s, knocking   the second down into a German town for his 13th victory. The only other claim was the destruction of a 190, shared by Capt. Vie L. Byers and Lt. Jack Terzian.   

Two days later a second major attack was  made on Berlin. This time losses were 37 bombers and 17 fighters, and the 353rd found the hunting better. Its pilots claimed three FW 190s damaged and five destroyed raising the Group total to 101 enemy aircraft destroyed. One 190 was shot down in the Hannover area by Lt. Zolner of the 350th.  He was then hit in the gas tank by flak and  came out on the deck until he was over Holland. There he bailed out successfully, becoming a POW.

The third Berlin attack came on March 9, 1944, and the Group’s mission report, like those of all other fighter groups, read:  "No enemy aircraft seen."     

Despite 330 heavies bombing their capital, the Luftwaffe  stayed on the ground.  From this point forward ,  the Luftwaffe would rise to defend against daylight attacks only when the targets were of the highest priority or when the tactical situation gave them a defensive advantage in some area. On such occasions there would be great air battles with heavy losses on both sides, but the 8th Air Force henceforth held control of the skies over Germany and the occupied countries. 

Glenn Duncan and Russ Spicer

During the winter months at the beginning of 1944, a pall of boredom settled over Glenn Duncan. Neither the heavies, usually flying above a complete undercast, nor the fighters’ bombing of German airfields were bringing the 109s and 190s up to fight with the P-47s. In February he expressed a growing thought to his Group Intelligence Officer, Major Henry B. Bjorkman. 

“Hank, if the Hun won’t come up and fight, then we’ll have to go down and get him. Most of the Huns we see these days are on the ground. Pick out a couple of German airdromes, and on our way home from today’s escort job, we’ll drop down and pay ‘em a visit.” 

The result of this conversation was the strafing of the enemy airfield northeast of Bonn on February 22. A few days later, Col. Duncan and Col. Spicer dropped into Hank Bjorkman’s office. They asked about a couple of airdromes in Holland, and two or three were selected when Hank asked what they were planning.

Duncan sort of rolled his eyes up and replied that he and Russ Spicer were going to drop a bomb or two on each airfield. What he did not say became clearer when he and Spicer took off by themselves with four 1000 lb. bombs,  one under each of their wings, and headed for Holland alone without clearance from Fighter Command. 

They found their airfields and attacked them on the deck. Bomb results were unobserved as they were full throttle departing the area for obvious reasons. They did not suffer damage in the low level attack catching the Germans by surprise. Their only greeting came from women and children waving white handkerchiefs to them as they skimmed by at tree top level. Never before had the peoples of occupied Europe seen U.S. planes doing business so close. 

With such experiences Col. Duncan mused, “Why don’t we do this thing up right? Why not organize a squadron of specialists, men who are thoroughly trained in the art of ground strafing?” Duncan presented this question to the “Old Man”, Maj. Gen. William E. Kepner, CG of VIII Fighter Command, at the beginning of March 1944. The results were immediate.

Ch 14

Ch 16